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Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries
Ronald J. Mann*
I.

Introduction

The Internet has produced significant changes in many aspects of
commercial interaction. The rise of Internet retailers is one of the most
obvious changes, but oddly enough the overwhelming majority of
commercial transactions facilitated by the Internet use a conventional
payment system. Thus, even in 2002, shoppers made at least eighty percent
of Internet purchases with credit cards.1 To many observers, this figure has
come as a surprise. The early days of the Internet heralded a variety of
proposals for entirely new payment systems—generically described as
electronic money—that would use wholly electronic tokens that consumers
could issue, transfer, and redeem. But years later, no electronic-money
system has gained a significant role in commerce.2
The continuing maturation of the Internet, however, has brought
significant changes to the methods by which individuals make payments.
Person-to-person (P2P) systems like PayPal now make hundreds of millions
of payments a year between individuals.3 The most common purpose is to
facilitate the purchase of items at Internet auctions, but increasingly P2P
*
William Stamps Farish Professor in Law, The University of Texas School of Law. I thank
Allison Mann for inspiration, Mark Gergen, Clay Gillette, Stephanie Heller, Doug Laycock, Lynn
LoPucki, Richard Markovits, Bob Rasmussen, Mark West, Jay Westbrook, and Jim White for
comments, John Meline for graphics, and Bill Powers for unstinting support.
1. The federal government does not collect official statistics about the use of various payment
systems, so I necessarily rely on published estimates. Because those estimates often are based on
survey data and similar sources, their accuracy is open to question. On this point, for example,
assessments differ substantially. See Linda Punch, Authentication’s Tentative Gains, CREDIT CARD
MGMT., May 2002, at 26, 26 (reporting that 90% of Internet purchases are made with credit cards
without specifying the relevant time frame); ePaynews.com, Payment Instruments as a Percentage
of Total eCommerce (reporting that, in 2002, 81.3% of Internet purchases were made with credit
cards), at http://www.epaynews.com/statistics/transactions.html#39 (last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
Those high rates of usage persist despite the widespread concern about the security of payments
made by credit card. See, e.g., ePaynews.com, US Credit Card Fraud Statistics, 2000–2007
(reporting rates of online credit card fraud about thirty times as high as overall credit card fraud
rates), at http://www.epaynews.com/statistics/fraud.html#21 (last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
2. The most famous of the electronic-money providers, DigiCash, eventually filed for
bankruptcy. For a discussion of the reasons that electronic-money products have failed to make a
market impact, see RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 491–97 (2002);
BRIAN MANTEL, WHY DON’T CONSUMERS USE ELECTRONIC BANKING PRODUCTS? TOWARDS A
THEORY OF OBSTACLES, INCENTIVES, AND OPPORTUNITIES (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., Emerging
Payments Occasional Paper Series No. EPS-2000-1, Sept. 2000), at http://www.chicagofed.org/
publications/publicpolicystudies/emerging payments.
3. See ePaynews.com, P2P Payment Provider Activity, 2001–2005 (reporting a total of 105
million P2P payments in 2002, and predicting more than 1.4 billion P2P payments in 2005), at
http://www.epaynews.com/statistics/transactions.html#45 (last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
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transfers are used to transfer funds overseas. Less far along, but gaining
transactions rapidly, are a variety of systems for electronic bill presentment
and payment (EBPP).4 Interestingly, both of these developments follow a
less ambitious path than the still-hypothetical electronic-money systems: they
involve the use of intermediaries to “piggyback” on existing systems to
provide payment. Thus, in essence, they use the technology of the Web site
to facilitate the use of conventional payment networks.5
However disparate these developments might seem at first glance, they
present a common challenge to the regulatory system.6 Unlike banks, which
control the execution of payment transactions in conventional payment
systems, the intermediaries that populate these new sectors generally are not
inevitably subject to regulatory supervision. At most, they are subject to
regulation as money transmitters (akin to the regulation of Western Union).7
That circumstance presents a serious gap in the regulatory scheme. The
pervasive regulatory supervision of banks helps to ensure that they honor
their obligations under a variety of consumer-protection and data-privacy
regulations that govern their activities.8 A shift of a significant share of
volume to the new and unregulated entities raises a corresponding risk of loss
from the irresponsibility of those entities.9 Thus, although the risk of fraud
and privacy violations is doubtless higher in these new forms of transactions
than it is in conventional transactions, the regulatory framework governing
them is much weaker.10

4. The market for online bill payment has the potential to be much larger than the P2P market.
A recent Federal Reserve study, for example, indicates that consumers in 2000 wrote about 15
billion checks to make bill payments. Geoffrey R. Gerdes & Jack K. Walton II, The Use of Checks
and Other Noncash Payment Instruments in the United States, FED. RES. BULL., Aug. 2002, at 360,
361, 367 n.15 (reporting that, in 2000, 42.5 billion payments were made by check, and that 36% of
checks written by consumers that could be classified by purpose were for bill payment). About a
quarter of Americans are currently using an EBPP product. See E-mail from CardFlash,
CardWeb.com, Inc., to Ronald J. Mann, Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law School
(Oct. 11, 2002) (on file with author) (reporting that 22% of Americans would be using e-billing
systems by the end of 2002).
5. See BRIAN MANTEL & TIM MCHUGH, CHANGING E-PAYMENT PAYMENT NETWORKS IN THE
U.S.: THE STRATEGIC, COMPETITIVE & INNOVATIVE IMPLICATIONS 2–10 (2002), at http://www.
chicagofed.org/paymentsystems/publications.cfm.
6. See Andrew L. Shapiro, Digital Middlemen and the Architecture of Electronic Commerce, 24
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 795, 801–05 (1998) (suggesting the need for new regulatory models to deal with
Internet-based reintermediation).
7. See infra notes 124–30 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of those protections, see infra subpart III(A).
9. For one of several articles about problems targeting P2P systems, see Linda Rosencrance, Email Scams Continue to Target PayPal Users (Mar. 10, 2003), at http://www.computerworld.com/
securitytopics/security/cybercrime/story/0,10801,79222,00.html. For a discussion of security
problems in EBPP systems, see Alexandria Andreeff et al., Electronic Bill Presentment and
Payment—Is It Just a Click Away?, ECON. PERSP., 4th Quarter 2001, at 2, 10, available at
http://chicagofed.org/publications/economicperspectives/2001/index.cfm.
10. See ePaynews.com, US Credit Card Fraud Statistics, supra note 1.
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Although the advent of the new transactions has been widely noted,11
the literature contains no sustained legal or policy analysis of the problems
that they pose. This Article responds to that challenge. The analysis
proceeds in three steps. Part II provides a summary description of the
mechanics of the systems, focusing on how they interact with existing payment systems and conventional actors in those systems. Part III explains the
problems with the existing laws (principally the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act12 (the EFTA) and regulations that the Federal Reserve has promulgated
to implement that statute). Generally, the problem is that the outdated provisions of the EFTA and the applicable regulations leave consumers exposed to
losses from fraud and error in the new transactions, even though federal law
would protect them from this loss if the transactions had been completed
directly with conventional payment systems. Finally, Part IV examines
broader questions of how to ensure that the new Internet intermediaries are
adequately motivated to comply with the obligations the EFTA and privacy
laws impose. Any regulatory intervention must accommodate both the
benefits of increased competition from those new entities and the risks that
their lack of responsibility will harm the consumers whose accounts are
involved in the transactions.
II.

The New Transactions

A. P2P Systems
The success of eBay’s auction business13 had the rare effect of creating
a vast market for an entirely new payment product, one that would allow
non-merchants (who cannot accept conventional credit card payments)14 to
receive payments quickly in remote transactions.15 Without such a system,
purchasers in the early days of eBay had to use cashier’s checks or money
11. See Andreeff et al., supra note 9, at 2; Kenneth N. Kuttner & James J. McAndrews,
Personal On-Line Payments, ECON. POL’Y REV. (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y.), Vol. 7, No. 3, at 35
(2001), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/2001.htm; Loretta J. Mester, The
Changing Nature of the Payments System: Should New Players Mean New Rules?, BUS. REV. (Fed.
Res. Bank of Phila.), Mar./Apr. 2000, at 3, available at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/br/br00.html;
Ann H. Spiotto, Electronic Bill Payment and Presentment: A Primer, 57 BUS. LAW. 447, 449–52
(2001); Ann Spiotto & Brian Mantel, Rethinking Business: Electronic Bill Payment and
Presentment and Aggregation, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, May/June 2001, at 18.
12. The EFTA is codified as Title IX of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1693–1693r (2000).
13. E.g., Brad Hill, What Makes eBay Invincible, E-COM. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003 (stating that
eBay booked “$15 billion in sales in 2002, far eclipsing Amazon’s . . . $4 billion”), at http://www.
ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/20900.html.
14. Currently, no credit card network in the United States has more than five million merchants
that accept it. See CardWeb.com, Inc., U.S. End-of-Year Merchant Acceptance by Brand—Current
& Historical, at http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/acceptance.html (last visited Nov. 17,
2003) (copy on file with author). Five million may be a lot, but it is only a few percent of the total
population of the nation.
15. See Kuttner & McAndrews, supra note 11, at 35.
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orders. Typically, sellers waited to ship products until they received the
paper-based payment device in the mail. From a flood of startups offering
competing products,16 PayPal (now owned by eBay) has emerged as the
dominant player in the industry,17 processing hundreds of millions of
payments each year.18 Indeed, industry sources expect that by 2005, auction
payments will account for ninety-five percent of the possibly four billion
person-to-person payment transactions expected to be made that year.19 A
separate (and much smaller) submarket, exemplified by CitiBank’s recently
abandoned c2it service, uses similar systems for cross-border payments.20
To understand the policy ramifications of P2P payments, it is necessary
to understand the relation between the P2P provider and the conventional
accounts from which and to which P2P payments are made. That relation
can be illustrated by a summary of the three steps that must be completed for
a successful P2P transaction.
1. Providing Funds for Payment.—The purchaser that wishes to use a
P2P provider to make a payment has two general ways to provide funds for
payment. First, it could fund an account21 with the provider, normally by

16. For a discussion of competitors in the heyday (around 2000), see ZDNet Anchor Desk, The
Check’s in the Email; P2P Payments Come of Age, ZDNET, Oct. 2, 2000 (discussing PayPal and
eight competitors), at http://reviews-zdnet.com.com/4520-6033_16-4205089.html.
17. For a discussion of the failed efforts by Amazon and Yahoo, see Hill, supra note 13.
18. Cf. PayPal, Welcome (stating that PayPal has “[o]ver 31 million accounts worldwide”), at
http://www.paypal.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2003). PayPal’s transaction volume increased by 80%
during the last year, rising to $2.63 billion in the first quarter of 2003. E-mail from CardFlash,
CardWeb.com, Inc., to Ronald J. Mann, Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law
(Apr. 25, 2003) (on file with author).
19. Lavonne Kuykendall, Year Later, Little Payoff in Web P-to-P Payment, AM. BANKER, Apr.
2, 2001, at 12. For a more pessimistic assessment (that there will be only 1.4 billion transactions in
2005), see P2P Payment Provider Activity, supra note 3.
20. See, e.g., Press Release, Citigroup, Citibank’s c2it Goes Global with International Funds
Transfer Capability (May 22, 2001) (on file with author) (describing the availability of transfers to
thirty countries); Rina Chandran, Sending the Greenbacks Home, HINDU BUS. LINE: INTERNET
EDITION, Aug. 8, 2002 (discussing the market advantages of the service, particularly for immigrants
sending money from the United States to their home countries), at http://www.blonnet
.com/catalyst/2002/08/08. For a discussion of PayPal’s relative weakness at international transfers,
see Tiernan Ray, eBay’s Secret Weapon, E-COM. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2003, at http://www.ecommerce
times.com/perl/story/21037.html.
21. To open an account with a P2P payment provider, a customer typically fills out a form at
the provider’s web site. Because funding into the system often will be accomplished from some
other account, that process is followed by some form of offline verification of the identity of the
customer. This precaution is required because P2P systems have been the subject of frequent
fraudulent attacks—both by organized crime groups trying to launder funds, see, e.g., Beth Cox,
eBay to PayPal Gamblers: No Dice, SILICONVALLEY.INTERNET.COM, July 12, 2002, at http://
siliconvalley.internet.com/news/article.php/1403631; Ina Steiner, eBay/PayPal Fraud with a Twist:
International Money Laundering, AUCTIONBYTES.COM, Jan. 29, 2003, at http://www.
auctionbytes.com/pages/abn/y03/m01/i29/s01, and by credit card thieves trying to extract
immediate cash, see Evan I. Schwartz, Digital Cash Payoff, TECH. REV., Dec. 2001, at
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/schwartz1201.asp.
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drawing on a deposit account or a credit card account. Because that process
ensures that funds are available for an immediate transfer, it is widely used
by those who make frequent purchases. P2P account balances are also
commonly used by frequent eBay sellers, who receive funds into their P2P
accounts from individuals who purchase the auctioned item. Alternatively,
the purchaser could wait until the moment that it wishes to make a purchase.
Again, it could choose at the time of payment to provide the funds in question by drawing on either a deposit account or a credit card account. As
discussed below, the choice between a credit card and a deposit account as a
funding source has significant legal consequences to the user.22
In either case, the fee structure is likely to discourage the use of credit
cards, because the P2P provider incurs higher fees when it pays the
interchange owed to the bank that has issued the credit card from which
funds are drawn than when it pays the fees necessary to draw funds from a
deposit account through a debit entry in the Automated Clearinghouse
(ACH) system.23 Similarly, because the P2P provider can profit by investing
funds that remain in transaction accounts, some providers (including PayPal)
encourage users to leave funds in those accounts by paying interest on
them.24
2. Making Payments.—The attraction of the P2P process is that it is
quite simple to make payments. Normally, the only information that the
purchaser needs to make a payment is the amount of money and the email
address of the intended recipient. After entering that information into a form
at the P2P provider’s Web site, the purchaser clicks on a “send money”
button to request execution of the transaction.25 If the funds are sent from a
balance in an account with the P2P provider or if they are drawn from a
credit card, they should arrive in a few hours. If funds are drawn directly
from a deposit account, arrival will be delayed by a few days (until
settlement of the ACH transaction to obtain the funds from the user’s bank).

22. See infra Part III.
23. At PayPal, for example, personal accounts cannot accept credit card payments. A user can
accept those payments only by upgrading to a Premier or Business account. PayPal, Fees Policy, ¶
b, at http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=p/gen/ua/policy_fees-outside (last modified Aug.
15, 2003) [hereinafter PayPal Fees Policy]. Those accounts are charged a schedule of fees starting
at 2.2% for payments that they receive. PayPal, Fees for Receiving Payments (Premier and
Business Accounts), at http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=p/gen/fees-receiving-outside
(last visited Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter PayPal Fees for Receiving Payments].
24. See Ron Leuty, PayPal Hunts for Steady Revenues, S.F. BUS. TIMES, July 16, 2001
(discussing the transition from a model in which PayPal made money “off the float” to a
transaction-fee model, under which transaction fees are now 90% of PayPal’s revenues), available
at http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2001/07/16/focus5.html.
25. See, e.g., PayPal, Send Money, at http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=p/ema/
index-outside (“See Demo” link) (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
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3. Collecting Payments.—The final step is for the recipient (the seller if
the payment is for an auction) to collect the payment. In the typical process,
the recipient receives an email notifying it that the payment has arrived.26 If
the recipient has an account with the P2P provider and is willing to leave the
funds in that account, then it is finished. If the recipient does not have an
account or wishes to withdraw the funds, it will need to go to the provider’s
Web site and provide the necessary details.27
Ordinarily, the recipient will pay some fee to the provider for making
the payment available. Those fees vary considerably, but a typical charge at
PayPal would be 25–50 cents plus 2–4% of the transaction amount.28 In
addition, if the payment is made with a credit card, the recipient may be
required to bear the cost of any chargeback that the payor seeks under its
agreements with the provider and card issuer.29
B. EBPP Systems
EBPP systems are not as developed as P2P systems.30 Accordingly, it is
harder to provide a clear picture of their operations. Generally, three

26. See PayPal, What Happens After I Send Money?, at http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/
webscr?cmd=_help-ext&eloc=364&loc=362&unique_id=1790&source_page=_home&flow= (last
visited Nov. 18, 2003) [hereinafter PayPal Procedures for Receiving Payments].
27. See PayPal, User Agreement for PayPal Service § 5.3 (describing procedures for
withdrawing funds from PayPal), at http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=p/gen/ua/uaoutside (last visited Oct. 29, 2003) [hereinafter PayPal User Agreement].
28. See PayPal Fees for Receiving Payments, supra note 23.
29. PayPal User Agreement, supra note 27, § 5.1. In the case of a reversed credit card
payment, the cost is likely to include not only the amount of the transaction, but also a chargeback
fee imposed by the credit card network (Visa or MasterCard, for example) of about $10. See PayPal
Fees Policy, supra note 23, ¶ e. PayPal will waive this chargeback fee under the circumstances laid
out in its Seller Protection Policy, which requires sellers to act prudently when accepting payments
and shipping goods. See PayPal, Seller Protection Policy, at http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/
webscr?cmd=p/gen/protections-outside (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
30. EBPP products gained a significant jump in usage during the anthrax scares in late 2001—
which at least temporarily raised consumer sensitivity to receiving and sending mail. See Keith
Regan, Report: Online Bill Payment Growing—Not Because of Mail Scares, E-COM. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2001 (discussing studies of spikes in EBPP usage about the time of the anthrax scares and
suggesting that there is a long-term growth trend), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/
story/14718.html. The continuing growth during the years since then suggests that these products
will continue to grow in importance during future decades. See sources cited supra note 4. Because
growth appears to correlate with the availability of broadband Internet access, see ePaynews.com,
How Broadband Changes Consumers’ Online Financial Activity (indicating that broadband access
is associated with a 46% increase in reviewing bills online and an 11% increase in paying bills
online), at http://www.epaynews.com/statistics/bankstats.html#23 (last visited Oct. 30, 2003), the
continuing growth of broadband access suggests that the market share of these products will
continue to grow rapidly. See CheckFree, Understanding EBP Models: Biller-Direct and BillDistribution 4–5 (2001) (copy on file with author) (arguing that EBPP will grow in usage as more
Americans are online). One recent survey estimates that about 28% of U.S. online households
currently have broadband access and that the rate is growing at about 9% per month. See Press
Release, Gartner, Inc., Gartner Dataquest Survey Shows Steady Increase of Broadband Access in
U.S. Households (Nov. 13, 2002), at http://www3.gartner.com/5_about/press_releases/2002_11/
pr20021113a.jsp.
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different models compete within that industry. The first model consists of
products presented by the billing businesses, which send bills to consumers
by email and provide a Web site at which payment can be made.31 The
second consists of products of depositary institutions, which permit their
customers to pay bills at a Web site operated by the institution.32 The third
consists of products offered by third-party intermediaries. The intermediaries operate Web sites that collect bills from various businesses,
present them to consumers on behalf of the billers, and then forward payment
from the consumers to the billers.33
As with P2P systems, the fact that the different models compete to
perform quite similar services for consumers should not obscure the
significantly differing legal and policy implications of the different models.
Accordingly, it is important to explain briefly how each of the three models
works.
1. Biller Web Sites.—As the name suggests, the biller Web site model is
quite simple. The consumer goes directly to the biller’s Web site to view the
bill. In many cases, the site will “push” the bill to the consumer by sending
an email that includes a link to the full details of the bill.34 If the consumer is
satisfied with the bill, it authorizes the biller to collect payment. The biller,
in turn, proceeds to collect the payment (often through a third-party provider
such as CheckFree).35 Alternatively, the biller itself could initiate an ACH
transaction debiting the consumer’s account.36
31. See ePaynews.com, EBPP Share Between Banks, Billers & Third-Party Providers (reporting
that the biller-direct model accounts for 35% of the 2003 market share), at
http://www.epaynews.com/statistics/bankstats.html#10 (last visited Oct. 30, 2003); Steve Bills,
Card Issuers Poised to Profit in Electronic Bills, AM. BANKER, June 11, 2002, at 8A, 9A
(discussing the success of credit card issuers using the biller-direct model); Chris Costanzo, Tech
Scene: E-Bill Presenters Meet Harsh Reality, See Hard Road Ahead, AM. BANKER, May 22, 2002,
at 1, 14 (discussing the biller-direct model more generally). American Express alone has more than
eight million customers who use that method of payment. ePaynews.com, Online Account
Management Figures for Banking & EBPP, at http://www.epaynews.com/statistics/bankstats.
html#33 (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
32. Estimates for the market shares of the different models differ sharply, but it is clear that the
bank-site model has a significant share of the market. See ePaynews.com, EBPP Share, supra note
31 (reporting a 20% market share for bank sites in 2003); Clare Saliba, Study: Customers Like
Banks for Online Bill Pay, E-COM. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001 (reporting that 55% of EBPP users use
sites maintained by their bank), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/14722.html.
33. As with so many of the aggregate market statistics relevant to this subject, estimates differ
sharply, but all show a significant share for third-party sites. See ePaynews.com, EBPP Share,
supra note 31 (reporting a 45% market share for third-party sites in 2003); Saliba, supra note 32
(reporting that 10% of EBPP users use independent providers).
34. For example, American Express offers a service that sends an e-mail each month to its
cardholders offering them a link to a place where they can view their monthly bill on the American
Express Web site. See American Express, Estatement, at http://www.americanexpress.com/online
cardbill/estatement_splash.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
35. See PAUL A. MURPHY, MURPHY & CO., THE MURPHY & CO. EBPP EXECUTIVE REPORT
30 (2003) [hereinafter MURPHY REPORT]. CheckFree enters into contracts with a large number of
billers and a large number of bill presentment sites of various kinds and routes the payments from
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As compared to conventional paper-based billing processes, those sites
can save the substantial costs of preparing and mailing paper bills, as well as
the costs of receiving and processing payments by mail.37 A substantial
reduction in the costs of customer-support systems will likely result, because
many inquiries can be shifted from the telephone to Web-site response
systems.38 Those sites also can have considerable marketing advantages,
both by enhancing the biller’s ability to provide targeted advertising and by
enabling the biller to develop more sophisticated customer profiles through
the collection of information about bill-paying habits.39 Many consumers
also will view the systems as more convenient than traditional paper-based
systems.40 The biggest problem with these systems is the inefficiency
resulting from each consumer’s going to a separate site to pay each bill.
In the marketplace, those sites have been moderately successful,
particularly for credit card issuers.41 Because the costs of the technology
continue to decrease, more billers may offer such sites as the number of
customers necessary for the sites to break even falls.42

the customers to the billers. For a description of the product, see CheckFree i-Solutions,
Distribution & Payment (describing CheckFree’s i-Processing Service), at http://www.checkfree
isolutions.com/solutions/distribution_payment/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
36. See Andreeff et al., supra note 9, at 7, 10 (discussing a variety of payment options).
37. Andreeff and others estimate those savings at about $80 billion per year under traditional
systems. Id. at 2–3; see also Dawne Chandler, Electronic Billing: Understanding the Road to
Adoption 2 (2002) (DST Output White Paper) (on file with author) (noting the cost savings
electronic billing provides); CheckFree, Understanding EBP Models, supra note 30, at 1–2
(discussing cost savings of electronic billing); Steve Kille, Leveraging Electronic Statement
Delivery 2 (MessagingDirect White Paper) (categorizing the various cost savings in detail), at
http://www.messagingdirect.com/publications/IC-6112.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2003); Lawrence J.
Radecki & John Wenninger, Paying Electronic Bills Electronically, CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. &
FIN., Vol. 5, No. 1 (Jan. 1999), at 1–2 (estimating costs at $20 billion), available at http://www.ny.
frb.org/research/current_issues/1999.html.
38. See IBM GLOBAL SERVICES, ELECTRONIC BILL PRESENTMENT AND PAYMENT: A
STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE 2 (2000) (examining the cost and service advantages of electronic
payments), available at http://www-1.ibm.com/services/files/emea_final.pdf; MURPHY REPORT,
supra note 35, at 93.
39. See Andreeff et al., supra note 9, at 4; Chandler, supra note 37, at 1–2; IBM GLOBAL
SERVICES, supra note 38, at 3.
40. Among other things, consumers can save the float caused by early payments by facilitating
payments that are made on precisely the date that the bill is due. They also can speed the payment
process, if paying at the Web site is a few seconds faster than writing and mailing a check. See
Andreeff et al., supra note 9, at 3–4; Chandler, supra note 37, at 1; IBM GLOBAL SERVICES, supra
note 38, at 4; Radecki & Wenninger, supra note 37, at 4. Those savings would amount to billions
of dollars each year. See CheckFree, Understanding EBP Models, supra note 30, at 2–3; MURPHY
REPORT, supra note 35, at 1 (estimating that EBPP would reduce bill-related costs by 26%,
translating into $4.4 billion in annual savings for U.S. consumers).
41. For example, one study estimates that 74% of e-billers were using their own sites by the end
of 2000. See Andreeff et al., supra note 9, at 6 (discussing the advantages of the biller-direct
model).
42. Advances in information technology have lowered those costs substantially. A new system
now could be set up for about $25,000 and pay for itself in just a few years with as few as 3,000
customers. See MURPHY REPORT, supra note 35, at 69.
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2. Internet Banking.—When banks provide sites, they can overcome the
biggest problem that biller Web sites face: the need for consumers to pay
their bills site by site.43 Thus, at the typical bank site, a consumer can pay
any bill necessary by entering onto a form at the site the information that the
consumer has about the payment. Smaller banks are likely to outsource all of
the payment functions to a third-party provider like CheckFree.44 Larger
banks may arrange the payments themselves in whatever manner is most
cost-effective. For example, if the recipient is a major biller (such as a local
utility), the bank may aggregate payments in a batch and pay them with a
single ACH transaction. For isolated transactions, the bank might even cut a
paper cashier’s check and mail it to the recipient. Those sites have been
particularly successful in recent years.45 One possible reason is that
consumers are more willing to trust the necessary financial information to a
bank at which they have a depositary relationship than to a third party billing
them for a payment.
Another advantage, particularly by comparison to the third-party sites
discussed below, is the simplicity of operation. The bank is already involved
in the payment transaction—whatever type of site the consumer uses—but
use of the bank’s site obviates the need for involvement of an extra party.
Also, many bank sites do not undertake to present bills electronically.
Rather, they simply provide an easy method for consumers to pay the bills
that are delivered to them by conventional means. Thus, they avoid the
complications attendant on electronic presentation of bills,46 which is a
common feature of the two competing models. Of course, this feature may
not be an advantage if consumers desire the functionality available from bill
presentment. Thus, it is no surprise that bank sites increasingly offer billpresentment services.
3. Third-Party Providers.—The most ambitious systems are Web sites
operated by third parties at which consumers can view and pay all (or almost
all) of their bills. The promise of those sites is a future of a single integrated
portal, through which all bills will be sent to a consumer and at which the
consumer will be able to pay all bills.47 The logistical problems of operating
such a site are daunting. For one thing, the intermediary operating such a site

43. CheckFree estimates that the “trigger” to induce the typical online consumer to use a
consolidated presenter would be if the presenter could deliver five bills per month electronically.
CheckFree, Understanding EBP Models, supra note 30, at 6.
44. See MURPHY REPORT, supra note 35, at 30 (discussing CheckFree’s product).
45. See id. at 33 (referring to a survey finding that 55% of consumers who pay bills online
choose their bank as their preferred site for online financial activities).
46. Many consumers have found those services to be too cumbersome. See Andreeff et al.,
supra note 9, at 7 (arguing that the biller-direct approach may not work as well on the broader
consumer market as does bill consolidation).
47. Teri Robinson, Time to E-Pay the Bills, INTERNETWEEK.COM, Oct. 23, 2000, at http://
www.internetweek.com/indepth/indepth102300-1.htm.
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(CheckFree, for example) must reach agreements with a large number of
billers allowing it to present bills on their behalf and establishing a
standardized data format for the information in those bills.48 At the same
time, the intermediary must persuade enough consumers to use the site to
justify the fixed costs of developing the site’s technology. Without a critical
mass of billers and consumers, the site cannot prosper. This problem is a
standard one of bandwagon effects.49
When a consumer uses such a site to pay a bill, the process operates
much as it does at a bank Web site. The consumer identifies the appropriate
bill and authorizes payment. The intermediary, in turn, arranges for the
payment to be sent to the biller, normally through an ACH debit entry from
the consumer’s deposit account.
For billers that do not operate their own sites, these third-party sites
offer a significant benefit because of the potential for the cost savings that
come from electronic presentation of bills (discussed above as a benefit of
biller Web sites).50 But the cumbersome nature of the technology to date has
made progress slow.51 Still, if third-party providers can overcome technical
problems, they could ultimately become the dominant model.52
III. Designing a Sound Regulatory System
The first step in assessing the adequacy of regulatory protections for the
developing Internet payment transactions is to determine the extent to which
the consumer protections that apply to existing transactions extend to the new
transactions. Two forms of consumer protection are relevant here:
information privacy and protection from losses related to fraud or error.
48. In recent years, CheckFree (www.checkfree.com) has become one of the leading players.
As discussed in the MURPHY REPORT, supra note 35, at 30, 40, Checkfree, in addition to its own
site, operates a significant network providing payment services to billers and banks that operate
their own sites. The United States Postal Service and Paytrust were significant early players in the
area. See U.S. Postal Service, Send Money & Payments, at http://www.usps.com/money/welcome
.htm?from=homedoorwaybar&page=0016money (last visited Mar. 12, 2003); Paytrust, Complete
Bill Management, at http://www.paytrust.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
49. See generally JEFFREY H. ROHLFS, BANDWAGON EFFECTS IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRIES chs. 3–4 (2001) (explaining the importance of supply and demand on bandwagon
effects). In the Introduction to his book, Rohlfs defines a bandwagon effect as “a benefit that a
person enjoys as a result of others’ doing the same thing that he or she does.” Id. at 1.
50. See supra section II(B)(1).
51. See, e.g., Andreeff et al., supra note 9, at 8 (explaining that the failure to adopt one industry
standard has caused integration issues to persist).
52. There is a consensus that the third-party provider model has the potential to provide the
most sophisticated aggregation of bills from a large set of providers. See id. at 9. On the other
hand, it is not clear whether those providers will be able to convince enough customers and billers
to join their systems to gain a major long-term role in the market. See id. (stating that the
“disadvantages of the consolidation models (namely: security, customer service, high fees, and
cumbersome enrollment procedures) may perpetuate the use of the biller-direct model”). Indeed,
the most likely outcome is that providers of all three types will survive. See MURPHY REPORT,
supra note 35, at 43 (predicting that direct billing and third-party aggregation will both remain
viable because each appeals to individual consumers in different ways).
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The simpler of those forms relates to information privacy. Specifically,
under Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB), “financial institutions” must not disclose
nonpublic personal information to third parties unless they have given their
customers an opportunity to opt out of any such disclosures.53 Some might
criticize the narrowness of that protection.54 It is much narrower, for
example, than protections afforded European consumers under the EU’s Data
Protection Directive and the statutes that implement it.55 But for present
purposes,56 what is important is that a broad definition of “financial
institution” in the applicable regulations means that the rules in GLB apply
with just as much force to the new intermediaries as they do to banks and
other depository institutions.57
It is much more complicated to assess the legal framework that protects
consumers from fraud and error, because that framework plainly does not
extend completely to the new payment intermediaries. To explain the
problems with that framework, the sections that follow summarize the
existing framework, the policy choices that it reflects, and how those rules
apply to problems likely to arise in the new transactions.
A. Existing Protections Against Fraud and Error
The most general protection for consumers in these transactions comes
from the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and Regulation E (which the Federal
Reserve has promulgated to implement the EFTA).58 The EFTA/E regime
applies to any electronic funds transfer (EFT). The statute broadly defines
that term to include not only Internet-initiated transactions, but also transactions at an automatic teller machine (ATM) and retail transactions that use a
debit card to draw directly on a deposit account.59 For any such transaction,
the statute generally protects consumers60 from losses caused by an
unauthorized transaction. Thus, if a consumer loses a debit card, the

53. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a) (2000) (indicating that financial institutions “may not . . . disclose to a
nonaffiliated third party any nonpublic personal information, unless such financial institution
provides . . . notice”).
54. For a general introduction to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, including a discussion of some of the
most prominent criticisms, see MANN & WINN, supra note 2, at 156–60.
55. See id. at 184–93 (discussing the Data Protection Directive and the broad protections
provided by the Directive to consumers).
56. Part IV considers the concern that the payment intermediary might comply with its privacy
obligations less reliably than a traditional depositary institution.
57. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(k)(2)(vi) (2003) (“A business that regularly wires money to and from
consumers is a financial institution . . . .”). For similar conclusions, see MURPHY REPORT, supra
note 35, at 109; Jeffrey P. Taft, Internet-Based Payment Systems: An Overview of the Regulatory
and Compliance Issues, CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP., Winter 2002, at 47.
58. The EFTA is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2000). Regulation E is located in 12
C.F.R. § 205 (2003). The EFTA and Regulation E will be referred to together as EFTA/E.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6); 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b).
60. For purposes of the EFTA and Regulation E, a consumer is any “natural person.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693a(5); 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(e).
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consumer’s bank would be obligated to restore to the consumer’s account
any funds removed for transactions that a thief made with the card. Two
important exceptions exist. First, the bank can charge the account a
deductible of up to $50 for each series of unauthorized transactions.61
Second, more importantly, the bank can charge the consumer more—and in
some cases the entire amount of the losses—if the consumer does not advise
the bank with sufficient promptness after the consumer learns that the card
has been stolen.62 The EFTA/E regime also provides a detailed disputeresolution process for resolving claims of errors by the financial institution in
charging a consumer’s account for a funds transfer.63
For credit card transactions, analogous protections come from the Truthin-Lending Act (TILA) and Regulation Z (which the Federal Reserve has
promulgated to implement TILA).64 Two important differences exist
between the two regimes. For one thing, the TILA/Z regime provides
broader protection for unauthorized losses—consumer responsibility is
capped at $50 even if the consumer fails to notify the bank that the card has
been stolen.65 Also, the TILA/Z regime grants consumers66 a broad right to
withhold payment even for authorized transactions if the seller fails to
perform as agreed.67 As discussed below, the right to withhold provides
consumers an important protection against seller fraud.
To the extent that the EFTA/E and TILA/Z regimes are justified, they
rest on a series of contestable premises about the ways in which consumers
interact with financial institutions. Among other things, they are in tension
with the possibility that rational consumers and financial institutions would
develop superior methods of allocating the risks and opportunities related to
their commercial interactions. Bob Cooter and Ed Rubin have provided the
most careful analysis of that problem, identifying a series of defects in the
market in which consumers contract with financial institutions.68 Perhaps the
most persuasive of their points undermines the idea that consumers make
informed choices about the relevant terms when they contract with financial

61. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(1).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(2).
63. Among other things, the process requires the institution to return disputed funds to the
consumer’s account within ten business days of receiving notice of the problem if it cannot
complete an investigation of the matter by that date. 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(a); 12 C.F.R. § 205.11.
64. The TILA is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1657 (2000). Regulation Z is located in 12
C.F.R. § 226 (2003). The TILA and Regulation Z will be referred to as TILA/Z.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b).
66. The definition of “consumer” under TILA and Regulation Z is narrower than the definition
in the EFTA/E regime, discussed supra note 60. It applies only if the funds in question are
advanced “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h); 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.11, 226.12.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1661i; 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c).
68. See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer
Payments, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 63, 68–70 (1987) (identifying defects such as cost of negotiation and
asymmetric information).
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institutions.69 As Cooter and Rubin explain, the rational individual consumer
will not expend the time and effort to identify and understand the specific
terms of the account agreement with its financial institution.70 In contrast,
the rational financial institution would expend considerable effort in formulating an agreement that furthered the bank’s interests.71 Thus, it is unlikely
that market pressures are driving the terms of consumer deposit-account
agreements to an efficient norm.72
A second problem with those rules—as they apply to the conventional
credit card and debit card transactions for which they are designed—is that
the rules erect distinctions that are difficult to justify as a policy matter. It is
easy to accept a distinction between the rules for near-cash transactions with
debit cards and the rules for borrowing transactions executed with credit
cards. Thus, a merchant that insists on taking cash justifiably might expect
the law to accord more finality to the transaction than a merchant that accepts
a device as unlike cash as a credit card.
But the differences between the EFTA/E and TILA/Z regimes do not
map well to that common-sense transactional distinction. For example, a
merchant that accepts a promissory note obviously has less certainty of final
payment than one that accepts cash, primarily because of the practical likelihood that the purchaser or borrower may choose not to pay—an option not
available to the cash purchaser. But in the conventional credit card
transaction, the card issuer by contract with the merchant agrees to accept the
risk that the cardholder will fail to pay balances charged on the card for
reasons other than assertion of a defense to payment.73 The TILA/Z regime
discussed above effectively deprives the merchant of the possibility of
making that contract, because any claim of a defect by the consumer will
result in an immediate charging of the transaction back to the merchant.74
It is easy to see why that right is useful to consumers. And substantial
policy reasons can be adduced to support it. For example, merchants might
have greater economies of scale and experience in conducting litigation than
69. Id. at 69.
70. Id. at 68–70.
71. See id. at 80–81 (noting that the presence of staff attorneys makes it easy and inexpensive
for financial institutions to pursue their legal interests, while consumers face higher legal costs and
lower stakes—and thus rarely pursue their legal interests).
72. The market defects that Rubin and Cooter identify are just as likely in the electronic context
as they are in the conventional banking context. Cf. Kuttner & McAndrews, supra note 11, at 42
(doubting that consumers are aware of the legal regime that governs P2P payments).
73. See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 112–16 (2d ed. 2003).
74. To be sure, it does so indirectly, because the TILA/Z regime directly imposes responsibility
for those defenses only on the issuer. But the effect is certain nonetheless, because of the pervasive
credit card network rules under which such claims are charged back to the merchant as soon as the
customer makes them. See id. Moreover, it appears that the applicable dispute-resolution systems
are designed to further the interests of issuers rather than merchants (or the institutions that process
transactions for them, commonly known in the trade as “acquirers”). My discussions with industry
professionals suggest that they generally are regarded as biased in favor of the cardholder.
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consumers. If so, placing the burden of litigation on the merchant by putting
the money in the hands of the consumers when the dispute begins might
produce results that are more equitable by offsetting the merchant’s
advantages.
But it is not clear why it is appropriate for that rule to extend to credit
card transactions but not to debit card transactions. The difficulty in
justifying the distinction only grows with the continuing convergence in the
functions of the two products. For one thing, roughly forty percent of
consumers use the credit card entirely as a convenience device, repaying
their entire bill each month.75 Why should their transactions have some
special protection solely because of the possibility that they could choose not
to pay for the transactions before interest began to accrue? Similarly, as
more and more merchants accept debit cards at the point of sale, is it
plausible as a policy matter that a consumer’s right to withhold payment
should depend on which particular piece of plastic the consumer swipes
through the payment terminal? Cutting the point even more finely, with the
advent of cards that include both credit and debit features, it is even harder to
justify the availability of the right to withhold payment turning on the way in
which the consumer interacts with the merchant’s payment terminal
(especially if that terminal is specifically designed to lead the consumer to
choose the debit option rather than the credit option that would give the
consumer a greater withholding right).76
Finally, several of the distinctions in the details between the TILA/Z
and EFTA/E regimes can be explained by nothing other than differences in
the level of concern for consumers in the differing Congresses that enacted
them.77 For example, what policy basis justifies the differing definitions of
consumers in the two systems,78 the differing protections for unauthorized
transactions,79 and the differing definitions of billing errors from which
consumers are protected?80
75. See CardWeb.com, Inc., Bank Credit Card Convenience Usage—Current, at
http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/convenience_usage.amp (last visited Nov. 17, 2003)
(copy on file with the author).
76. Interestingly, the main justification for the interface design is the lower interchange
merchants pay for debit card transactions than for credit card transactions, not the greater rights the
customers obtain in the credit card transactions. See David Breitkopf, PIN-Signature Debit Tug-ofWar Escalates, AM. BANKER, Feb. 25, 2002, at 6 (discussing the conflicting interests of merchants
and customers, which prefer PIN-based debit, and banks, which prefer signature debit).
77. I owe this explanation to Bob Rasmussen, which I adopt for lack of a better one of my own.
See also Cooter & Rubin, supra note 68, at 91 (attributing some differences to “pure guesswork and
political necromancy”).
78. Compare supra note 66 (discussing the definition of “consumer” in the TILA/Z regime),
with supra note 60 (discussing the definition of “consumer” in the EFTA/E regime).
79. Compare supra text accompanying note 65 (discussing unauthorized transaction rules in the
TILA/Z regime), with supra text accompanying note 62 (discussing unauthorized transaction rules
in the EFTA/E regime).
80. Compare TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1666(c) (2000), and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 (2003)
(together defining billing error to include, among other things, any transaction for “goods or
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From a broad perspective, the incoherence of those distinctions suggests
that the system would be improved by the articulation of a set of general
legal rules to govern consumer payment systems. Those rules presumably
would eradicate many of the distinctions that current law draws between
functionally similar payment systems. At the same time, they plausibly
might include distinctions between face-to-face and remote (telephone, mailorder, and Internet) transactions. For current purposes, the distinctions are
important not because of the possibility that some future legislature might
remove them. They are important to this project because they have been
carried over into the Internet payment transactions—the focus of this
Article—with no more coherence in that context than they have in the
context where those distinctions developed.
B. Protections Against Fraud and Error in the New Transactions
Unfortunately, the legal framework protecting consumers against fraud
and error has not been updated to accommodate the new transactions. Thus,
that framework includes three types of problems: situations where the
incoherent distinction between the TILA/Z and EFTA/E regime is replicated
in the new environment, minor oversights in regulatory drafting, and more
significant omissions in regulatory coverage. The sections below discuss
how those rules apply to the new transactions and underscore those problems
where they arise.
1. P2P Transactions.—Current experience suggests that fraud is a
serious problem in P2P transactions. One Federal Reserve researcher
estimates that PayPal’s fraud rate of 0.66%, albeit much lower than the rate
of online credit card fraud, is about four times the rate of fraud for retail
credit card transactions and more than sixty times the rate for retail debit card
transactions.81 But the legal rules for determining whether the consumer
bears the losses from that fraud depend in an important way on how the
consumer pays for the transaction. To see the point, imagine an eBay auction
in which a fraudulent seller never ships any goods to the buyer.82 If the
transaction is funded from the purchaser’s account with the P2P provider, it

services . . . not delivered to the obligor . . . in accordance with the agreement made at the time of a
transaction”), with EFTA, 15 U.S.C. § 1693f (2000), and Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.11 (2003)
(together giving a much narrower definition of “error”).
81. See Tim McHugh, The Growth of Person-to-Person Electronic Payments, CHI. FED.
LETTER, Aug. 2002, at 2 (estimating effective fraud rates for credit cards at 0.15%, debit cards at
0.01%, and online credit card transactions at 2.50%), at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fed
letter/2002/cflaug2002_180.pdf.
82. The situation is not hypothetical. See, e.g., Scam Casts Doubt on eBay’s Anti-Fraud
Software, MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 21, 2003 (discussing a recent scam in which an Arizona couple
stole $100,000 from more than 500 bidders), at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/
5450291.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).
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is an EFT governed by the EFTA.83 In that event, the purchaser has no right,
either against the financial institution or the P2P provider, to recover the
funds for an authorized transaction solely because of a complaint about
misconduct by the seller, however meritorious the complaint. The same
analysis applies if the purchaser funds the transaction by authorizing a
transfer directly from the purchaser’s deposit account. This type of
transaction is also an EFT covered by the EFTA/E regime.84
But if the buyer has the good luck (or foresight) to fund the purchase
directly from a credit card, the transaction is governed by the TILA/Z
regime. Thus, among other things, the purchaser should have the right to
withhold payment if the seller in fact never supplies the goods.85 The statute
grants a broad right to the cardholder to withhold payment based on “all
claims (other than tort claims) and defenses arising out of any transaction in
which the credit card is used as a method of payment.”86 Thus, if the transaction through PayPal is viewed as a single unified transaction in which the
auction purchaser uses PayPal and the credit card to buy something from an
auction seller, the TILA/Z regime protects the purchaser.87 As discussed
above, it is odd to have such an important protection turn on something that
is as trivial to the transaction as the method by which the purchaser funds the
transaction to the P2P provider. But it is not any more odd to see that
distinction here than it is to see it in the conventional point-of-sale context.
The other likely type of fraud is for a third party to obtain the
consumer’s PayPal login information and use that information to conduct an
unauthorized transaction by drawing on the consumer’s PayPal account.88 If
the interloper draws directly on the P2P account, Regulation E makes the

83. The EFTA defines an “electronic fund transfer” as a “transfer of funds . . . initiated through
an electronic terminal . . . so as to . . . authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an account.”
15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6); see also 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (giving a similar definition).
84. See supra note 83 (quoting the relevant statutory language).
85. In the framework of the statute, the bank attempting to collect the credit card bill would be
subject to the defense that the PayPal purchaser never received the goods it purchased. See supra
note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the TILA/Z right to withhold payment).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1666j(a).
87. The statute could be read more narrowly. American Express, for example, apparently has
argued that the transaction is one in which PayPal is the seller and that PayPal has satisfied its
obligation by sending money to the seller. On that understanding, American Express (or any other
card issuer with the boldness to raise the argument) would have no obligation to respect the defense
under 15 U.S.C. § 1666j. Even American Express, however, receded from that position after it was
challenged recently by the New York Attorney General. Ina Steiner, American Express Agrees to
Honor PayPal Complaints, AUCTIONBYTES.COM, Oct. 3, 2003, at http://www.auctionbytes.com
/cab/abn/y03/m10/i03/s01. My students’ reaction to this question convinces me that the reading
advanced by American Express is a plausible one. Accordingly, a revision of Regulation Z to
remove that ambiguity would be useful.
88. That is the point of some of the most prominent recent schemes directed at PayPal
customers. See Alorie Gilbert, PayPal Users Targeted by Email Scam, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 10,
2003 (discussing a recent scam involving e-mails fraudulently purporting to be from PayPal), at
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/hardware/emergingtech/0,39020357,2131645,00.htm
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P2P intermediary directly responsible: subject to the normal exceptions, the
P2P provider cannot charge the consumer’s account for the transaction.89
The same result applies under the TILA/Z regime if the interloper uses the
information to draw funds from the consumer’s credit card.90
The only ambiguity applies if the interloper uses the information to
withdraw funds from the consumer’s deposit account. In that event—
because of an odd glitch in the regulation—it seems that neither the P2P
provider nor the bank is obligated to return the funds to the consumer’s
deposit account. The bank apparently is not obligated because it is entitled to
treat the transaction as authorized. A transaction is authorized under the
EFTA if it is executed by a party (the P2P provider in this case) to whom the
consumer has given the relevant access information.91 Because that fact
makes the transaction “authorized” with respect to the account from which
funds were drawn, it appears that the rules related to “unauthorized”
transactions impose no obligation on the P2P provider for the loss. The most
likely source of recovery for the consumer would be an action against the
P2P provider’s depositary institution (the entity that originated the ACH
transfer) for a breach of the applicable National Automated Clearing House
Association (NACHA) warranties.92 Because of the limited litigation to date
in that area, it is difficult to assess the likelihood of prevailing in such an
action.93
This problem, however, is not a serious one. Unlike the incoherent
boundary between the EFTA/E and TILA/Z regimes, which is a somewhat
more permanent feature of our system, this problem seems to be a simple
glitch, which the Federal Reserve easily could remedy on its own volition.94
89. The intermediary is a financial institution under 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(8) and 12 C.F.R. §
205.2(i). Because the transaction is unauthorized, the intermediary cannot remove more than $50 of
funds from the account under 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a). See also 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(1) (limiting
consumer liability for unauthorized transfers to $50 if the financial institution is timely notified of
loss or theft). If the intermediary does remove more than $50, it must restore the funds within ten
business days of proper notice under 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(c) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(c)(2)(i).
90. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b) (2003).
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(1) (2000) (defining “accepted card or other means of access”); id. §
1693a(11) (defining “unauthorized electronic fund transfer”); 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(1) (2003)
(defining “[a]ccess device”), id. § 205.2(m) (defining “[u]nauthorized electronic fund transfer”).
92. See NACHA OPERATING RULE § 2.2.1.1 (2003) (describing the warranty of authorization
by the Originator of an ACH transfer); see also MANN, supra note 73, at 157–65 (discussing
generally the ACH system and the legal framework that governs it).
93. The limited cases to date suggest that all parties to the transaction arguably have a claim for
breach of that warranty. See, e.g., Sec. First Network Bank v. C.A.P.S., Inc., No. 01-C-342, 2002
WL 485352, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2002) (permitting suit by a victim of fraud against a bank that
executed unauthorized ACH transfers).
94. One simple response would be to add a new subsection 205.14(b)(3) to Regulation E stating
as follows:
Any unauthorized transaction that results in the removal of funds from the account at
the financial institution will constitute a billing error for purposes of Section
205.11(a)(1), for which the payment service provider is responsible under Section
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2. EBPP Transactions.—Because of the variety of business models, it is
difficult to provide a comprehensive schema of the types of transactions that
pose risks for consumers. But one simplifying factor is the general absence
of credit card payments from those transactions. This absence means that the
legal issues focus almost entirely on the reach of the EFTA/E regime,95 rather
than its boundary with the TILA/Z regime. The simplest approach is to look
separately at the risks posed by each of the three prevailing business models.
a. Biller Web Sites.—The most likely difficulty is an unjustified
payment to the biller. The biller might pay one consumer’s bill from another
consumer’s account or it might pay itself for a bill even if the consumer did
not in fact authorize payment. Interestingly enough, the EFTA/E regime
would not provide protection in either case. As discussed above, the
consumer cannot claim that the transactions are “unauthorized” for purposes
of the EFTA/E regime.96 For similar reasons, the consumer cannot claim that
they amount to an “error.” The statutory definition of “error,” albeit vague,
is directed to errors by the bank, not errors by a third party to whom the
consumer has granted access.97 Thus, the statute offers the consumer no
recourse in that situation. Given the likely solvency of the typical billing
entity, perhaps the situation is not unduly troublesome, but it does seem
inconsistent with the general philosophy of the EFTA/E regime as applied to
conventional transactions.
b. Internet Banking.—The framework for Internet banking is the
simplest. Because there is no intermediary,98 the financial institution takes
all actions regarding the account. Accordingly, the rules in the EFTA/E
regime apply directly to protect the consumer from unauthorized transactions
and errors.

205.14(a), if the transaction involves the use of either (A) the access device issued by
the payment service provider to the customer or (B) the access device provided by the
consumer to the payment service provider for the account at the financial institution.
Because subsection 205.14(b)(2) plainly implements the error-resolution procedures as against the
payment service provider, the proposed subsection would ensure that the provider is obligated to
restore funds to the consumer’s account at the consumer’s bank just as quickly as the bank would
have to restore funds for a traditional unauthorized transaction.
95. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1)(vi) (Supp. I 2003) (including within the definition of
“electronic fund transfer” the “payment made by a bill payer under a bill-payment service available
to a consumer via computer or other electronic means”).
96. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(f) (2000).
98. As discussed supra note 35, an intermediary (such as CheckFree) might come between the
bank and the payee. But this is irrelevant to the concerns of this Article, because no intermediary
would come between the consumer and the institution that holds the consumer’s deposit account.
To put it another way, it is plain that Regulation E would protect the consumer from mistakes by
CheckFree operating as an intermediary between the bank and the payee.
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c. Third-Party Providers.—As the discussion above suggests, the
harshest results for consumers come from the third-party systems because the
insertion of an intermediary enhances the likelihood that the EFTA/E regime
will not apply. Two general problem transactions are apparent:
(1) Interloping and Erroneous Bills.—In this scenario, a
malefactor fabricates a bill and has the provider send it to the consumer.
Alternatively, and less maliciously, the bill is a legitimate one that, because
of an error by the intermediary, is posted and distributed to the wrong
consumer. Suppose that the consumer pays the fraudulent or erroneous bill.
For the reasons discussed above, the consumer will not be able to claim that
the transaction is either unauthorized or a remediable error.99 Of course, in
this particular transaction it is easy to fault the consumer for not detecting the
spoofed bill. But in many of the existing cases of Internet fraud, a consumer
of ordinary sophistication would not necessarily have recognized the
problem. Imagine a bill purporting to come from your local electric utility,
in a format visually identical to the electric bill you receive every month,
which arrives 29 days after your last bill and is in an amount approximately
equal to that bill. Your first hint of a problem is likely to come when the
legitimate bill appears the next day. Given that problem (a variation on the
new Internet crime called “phishing”),100 it is reasonable to consider whether
intermediaries should bear those losses. If they were responsible for those
losses, they might be better motivated to develop technology to detect such
infiltrations.101 For present purposes, the important point is that the existing
legal rule for this situation reflects pure happenstance rather than a reasoned
resolution of the economic and policy issues.
(2) Interloping Payments.—In this scenario, the intermediary
makes a payment based on an instruction from an interloping malefactor
rather than the consumer. As with the analogous P2P transactions, the
ambiguity in the regulation’s coverage of unauthorized transactions leaves a
substantial possibility that the consumer has no protection.102
3. Summary.—Although the discussion in the preceding sections might
seem unduly detailed, the level of detail is important to show how difficult it
is to design a system to govern the transactions in question. Neither the
EFTA nor Regulation E is particularly old. They are not supervised by a
regulatory agency out of touch with the developments in these transactions,
99. See supra notes 91, 97 and accompanying text.
100. “Phishing” is defined as “[c]reating a replica of an existing Web page to fool a user into
submitting personal, financial, or password data.”
The Word Spy, Phishing, at
http://www.wordspy.com/words/phishing.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).
101. See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 68, at 89 (making that point generally).
102. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
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and many of the most informative papers in the area are written by Federal
Reserve staff,103 particularly by members of the group studying emerging
payments in its Chicago branch. The point is that these transactions are
developing so rapidly and with such fertile inventiveness that it is difficult to
expect any regulatory system to keep pace and ensure coherent coverage as
long as the system is premised on the categorical distinctions that drive the
current framework.
Thus, even with a coherent response to the problems addressed above,
new problems may emerge rapidly, leaving the regulatory coverage again
uncertain. Such problems are inevitable until and unless a more functional
code is adopted to govern electronic payments generally. Meanwhile, the
minor change discussed above104 could at least make the system as coherent
for these transactions as it is for conventional transactions.
IV. Ensuring Regulatory Compliance
Part III of this Article operates entirely within the framework of the
existing regulatory apparatus. Thus, it is limited to considering the extent to
which GLB and the EFTA/E and TILA/Z regimes replicate for the new
transactions the regulatory environment that they impose on conventional
transactions. This Part examines the regulatory system from a broader
perspective. It starts by focusing on a fundamental problem implicit in the
existing system: the distinction between the level of responsibility to be
expected from conventional financial institutions and that to be expected
from the new Internet-based intermediaries. It then discusses three types of
potential regulatory approaches.
Finally, it summarizes tentative
recommendations for the P2P and EBPP contexts based on what we currently
know about them.
A. The Problem
The EFTA and TILA use the typical apparatus of the modern federal
regulatory statute: provisions for class actions, statutory damages, attorney
fees, and the like.105 Accordingly, it would be natural to conclude that a
careful analysis of the problems discussed in Part III of this Article should be
enough to resolve the problem. Once the EFTA/E and TILA/Z regimes are
brought up to date, we might think that the new entities would comply and all
would be well.
But two general concerns make that optimistic outlook seem
implausible. First, it is doubtful that the kinds of civil-liability regimes at
hand, which rely primarily on litigation by small and dispersed consumers,
will be able to control the behavior of the large businesses at which they are
103. See supra note 11.
104. See supra note 94.
105. EFTA, 15 U.S.C. § 1693m (2000); TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2000).
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directed, particularly when the facts of each unauthorized transaction and
billing error often will be specific to each individual consumer.106
Second, the pervasive federal regulation of banks substantially increases
the likelihood that banks will comply with their obligations under the
TILA/Z and EFTA/E regimes. At the most basic level, the direct purpose of
much of federal banking regulation—federal supervision of capital
maintenance and lending practices—is to ensure the solvency and fiscal
prudence of the institutions.107 If that regulation is even marginally
effective,108 it increases the likelihood that banks will have the assets
necessary to comply with their obligations under those statutes. That might
seem like a small thing, but the likelihood that a major Internet payment
fraud could create a regulatory responsibility beyond the assets of a small
dotcom P2P provider is plausible.109 That possiblity is particularly true given
the likelihood that those providers will be targets for fraudulent activity, as
PayPal has been.110 More generally, the persistent supervision and need to
accommodate regulators on a regular basis makes it quite difficult for a bank
to adopt a cavalier attitude about regulatory compliance.111

106. See, e.g., Cooter & Rubin, supra note 68, at 80–82 (discussing difficulties consumers face
in suing financial institutions).
107. See, e.g., Alvin C. Harrell, Deposit Insurance Issues and the Implications for the Structure
of the American Financial System, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 179, 179–80 (1993).
108. For general economic analysis of the effects of the American system on the incentives of
institutions and their customers, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk
Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1200–01 (1988)
(discussing the use by institutions of brokered deposits to regain solvency); Robert C. Merton, An
Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. 3,
3–5 (1989) (noting the problems small depositors and financial institutions face in guaranteeing the
safety of the deposits and recommending governmental guarantees); Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit
Insurance and Bank Regulation: The Policy Choices, 44 BUS. LAW. 907, 908–11 (1989) (describing
problems faced by financial institutions in the 1980s and the possible causes). Considerable doubt
exists about how to design an optimal banking regulatory system. For insightful discussions of
other systems, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, Japan’s Experience with Deposit Insurance and Failing
Banks: Implications for Financial Regulatory Design, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 399 (1999); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Is Deposit Insurance Inevitable? Lessons from Argentina, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 211
(1996).
109. See Kuttner & McAndrews, supra note 11, at 41–42 (discussing the liquidity risk that
would arise if payment intermediaries handled larger numbers of transactions and the regulations
that limit that risk for banks); Spiotto & Mantel, supra note 11, at 20 (noting “the rapid emergence
in the past two years [before 2001] of small aggregators with few assets”).
110. See Gilbert, supra note 88 (describing a fraudulent e-mail scheme designed to elicit bank
and credit card account numbers from PayPal users); Christopher Null, Bogus Alerts Target PayPal
Users, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 14, 2003 (discussing schemes that sent PayPal users to bogus sites at
www.paypai.com and www.paypalsys.com), at http://www.wired.com/news/ebiz/0,1272,57673,
00.html; Rosencrance, supra note 9 (describing an e-mail scheme designed to gain access to the
bank accounts of PayPal users).
111. Consider the pervasive preoccupation with a bank’s Community Reinvestment Act
obligations by regulators examining wholly unrelated transactions. See Kenneth H. Thomas, CRA
at 25: Reforming an Almost Perfect Law, AM. BANKER, Dec. 13, 2002, at 6 (noting that the CRA
requires the “federal bank and thrift agencies [to] periodically assess an institution’s CRA record
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The same analysis applies to privacy obligations. It does not take a
hardened cynic to think that the chances of systematic noncompliance—or
even lackadaisical compliance that tolerates a significant number of lowlevel violations—is much more likely for unregulated companies than for
regulated depository institutions.112 In assessing that likelihood, it is
important to note that GLB, unlike TILA and the EFTA, does not provide for
a private cause of action.113 Finally, it also is worth wondering whether
smaller companies that are unregulated and financially constrained will be
adequately motivated to expend the resources necessary to protect their
consumer’s information from unauthorized access by third parties.
To put the point generally, the regulatory regimes directed to the
activities of the new payment intermediaries depend in part for their
effectiveness on the background regulatory supervision of the banks
governed by those regimes. Because nonbank payment intermediaries are
not generally subject to that supervision,114 there is a cognizable risk that they
will show less care in complying with those regimes than conventional
depository institutions.115 The next section discusses three types of potential
responses to that problem.
B. Potential Responses
Because of the fluid and rapid pace of development in the industry, it is
difficult to design a response to the regulatory gap discussed in the previous
section. Accordingly, I start in this section with a general analysis of the
pros and cons of three general approaches: doing nothing, adopting more
onerous regulation of Internet payment intermediaries, or imposing liability
on banks for the failure of the intermediaries to comply with their regulatory
obligations. The Article concludes in the next section with an application of
that analysis that includes tentative recommendations on the best course of
action under current circumstances.

and consider that record when acting on branch or merger applications”). The parallel is not
perfect, of course, because the CRA is specifically designed to lead to the conditioning of merger
transactions on a good record of CRA compliance, see id., but the point still seems valid. The
pervasive control of banking regulators makes it seem most difficult for a bank consciously to
maintain a pattern of regulatory noncompliance.
112. See Radecki & Wenninger, supra note 37, at 5 (discussing banks’ motivation to protect
their customers’ privacy and the steps banks have already taken to increase information security).
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 6805 (2000) (authorizing enforcement by regulatory authorities); MANN &
WINN, supra note 2, at 159.
114. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
115. See Kuttner & McAndrews, supra note 11, at 42 (noting that protecting customers against
fraudulent use of their accounts “is a major concern”); Mester, supra note 11, at 16 (“[T]hey still
deserve monitoring. For example, they may expose individuals and institutions using them to
substantial liability through fraud.”).
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1. Doing Nothing.—The first possibility is to do nothing. At this point,
the concerns expressed above are largely (though not entirely)116 conjectural.
An advantage of the current system is that it permits ready entry into the
market, which has facilitated rapid development of the competing business
models and vigorous competition among the various providers. Thus, the
P2P market is growing rapidly and already has experienced a considerable
shakeout of weaker and unsuccessful providers.117 The EBPP market is even
more fluid, so it is too soon to predict exactly what types of services these
providers will offer.118 Inevitably, any regulatory intervention would
heighten barriers to entry in the industry. The barriers would be likely to
have the immediate effect of limiting competition, particularly by smaller
and newer companies.119
Thus, regulatory intervention might drive
intermediaries from the market, even if their model might have prevailed in
the marketplace.120
In assessing the weight of that concern, it is necessary to credit the
importance of “network” or “bandwagon” effects121 in this industry.122 Thus,
PayPal’s success in the P2P market shows some of the signs of a successful
implementation of a lock-in strategy: an early effort to acquire customers by
offering services at a very low (indeed, negative) price. This strategy led to
rapid growth of a customer base and was followed in turn by the imposition

116. See infra notes 159 (discussing existing complaints about P2P providers) & 166
(discussing existing complaints about EBPP providers) and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Andreeff et al., supra note 9, at 4–10 (discussing the different EBPP presentment
models used by various competitors, and evincing an inability to predict which, if any, of the
existing models will succeed in the market).
119. I assume a considerable economy of scale and learning curve in enduring regulatory
burdens.
120. Cf. Andreeff et al., supra note 9, at 9 (stating that “[a]lthough industry experts suspect that
consumers will ultimately prefer to have all of their bills presented at one location, the
disadvantages of the consolidation models (namely, security, customer service, high fees, and
cumbersome enrollment procedures) may perpetuate the use of the biller-direct model”).
121. For general discussion of how those effects can lock in an early industry leader’s success,
see ROHLFS, supra note 49, at 43; CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES ch. 5
(1999). As Rohlfs explains, the basic idea is that some products have external demand-side scale
economies—features external to the production process that make demand for products increase as
the number of units of the product already sold increases. See ROHLFS, supra note 49, at 55. For a
well-reasoned skeptical view about the common occurrence of lock-in, see generally STAN J.
LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND
ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1999) (collecting and amplifying a substantial body of
periodical literature by Liebowitz and Margolis).
122. See Kille, supra note 37, at 3 (noting that “sufficient use by recipients” is the “KEY
requirement for successful” use of electronic presentation of bills); James J. McAndrews, Network
Issues and Payment Systems, BUS. REV. (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila.), Nov./Dec. 1997, at 15, 22–24
(noting a number of examples in the payments context, including ATM adoption and PIN-based
debit cards), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/br/br97.html; Mester, supra note 11, at 14–
15; Radecki & Wenninger, supra note 37, at 5 (discussing the importance of “network effects” to ebilling system developers).

704

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 82:681

of substantial transaction fees.123 Without that kind of sustained effort, it is
very difficult for that type of network good to obtain a sufficient critical mass
of users to reach the maximum optimal level of deployment. It would be
unfortunate if a well-intentioned regulatory intervention had the effect of
stifling the competition necessary for such products to be introduced
successfully. On the other hand, the absence of regulatory intervention may
enhance the possibility that the competition will go beyond robust to unfair.
But that concern seems less significant given the fact that the existing
players—the ones who would be at risk of harm from unduly aggressive
competition—are financial institutions (presumably capable of protecting
themselves from such conduct).
2. Direct Regulation of Intermediaries.—The second possibility is to
adopt some form of regulatory supervision for Internet intermediaries. The
benefits of that approach are obvious. First, it enhances protections for
consumers by providing a backstop to the direct legal obligations of
intermediaries, parallel to the backstop that federal regulatory authorities
provide for banks. Second, it levels the playing field left uneven in the
present arrangement, in which banks always are subject to intensive
regulatory supervision but Internet payment intermediaries are subject to
little or no supervision.
The first issue is to decide what type of regulatory system would be
appropriate. Because the entities are not themselves holding demand-deposit
accounts, the case for full-scale bank regulation is quite weak. Among other
things, Internet intermediaries are not subject to the kinds of “runs” that
make the stability of depository institutions an important object of public
policy.
Accordingly, the appropriate form of regulation would be something
less intrusive, similar to the existing regulation of money transmitters (to
which PayPal is subject in many states).124 That regulation generally requires
businesses to obtain a state license,125 imposes periodic reporting
requirements,126 and subjects them to audits by state officials.127 It also often
123. See Leuty, supra note 24, at 1–2 (discussing the development of PayPal’s fee and revenue
structure); SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 121, ch. 6 (discussing frankly how to execute a
successful lock-in strategy). In economic terms, the problem is how to obtain a sufficiently large
critical mass of users to allow expansion of the market to the maximum equilibrium user set. See
ROHLFS, supra note 49, at 20–28. For case studies on successful and unsuccessful attempts to
obtain that critical mass, see id., ch. 6–13.
124. PayPal, State Licenses (listing jurisdictions in which PayPal is licensed, along with the
corresponding governing statutes and regulatory agencies for each jurisdiction), at
http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=p/ir/licenses-outside (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
125. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1202 (West 1999); 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
657/10 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 53.02 (West 2002); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 152.201
(Vernon Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-371 (Michie Supp. 2003).
126. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1211 (West 1999).
127. See, e.g., 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 657/55 (West 2000).
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includes minimum net worth128 or bond requirements129 or imposes
restrictions on permissible investments.130
The next issue is to decide at what level the regulations should be
imposed. Money transmitters currently are regulated at the state level, not
the federal level.131 As that industry has become more consolidated,
considerable pressure has arisen for more uniformity in the various state
regulatory schemes.132 That pressure, in turn, has led to the recent drafting
and promulgation of the proposed Uniform Money Services Act (UMSA)
(already adopted in Iowa, Vermont, and Washington).133 Although that
statute probably would not apply to EBPP providers in its current form, its
substantive provisions provide a useful and up-to-date template for
regulation.
The difficult question is whether state, rather than federal, regulation is
appropriate. Inconsistent state regulations are more problematic for Internetbased businesses.134 This is particularly true as the share of cross-border
payments increases, which raises the prospect of regulation by the several
states of this country and foreign countries.135 Thus, although the simplest

128. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:15C-5 (West 2001); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 152.203
(Vernon Supp. 2003).
129. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-12105 (West 1999); 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
657/30 (West Supp. 2003).
130. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1212 (West 1999); 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
657/50 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53B.06, 53B.08 (West 2002).
131. However, the operation of an unlicensed money transmitter business is a federal criminal
offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2000).
132. See Taft, supra note 57, at 43 (noting that the popularity of new payment technologies and
the inconsistency of the states’ regulatory approaches led the drafters to broaden the scope of the
UMSA to include the new products and services).
133. For the text of the final version of the Act (promulgated in 2001), see UNIF. MONEY
SERVS. ACT (2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/moneyserv/UMSA2001
Final.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2003) [hereinafter UMSA]. For discussion of the drafting and
promulgation of the UMSA, see Taft, supra note 57, at 43–44. For enactment updates, see Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Legislative Activity by Act (2002–2003) (showing
current enactment in Iowa and Washington), at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/LegByAct.pdf (last
visited Nov. 3, 2003).
134. The irrationality of subjecting Internet-based businesses to widely varying state regulatory
schemes has been the principal reason that Congress persistently has protected those entities from
state sales and use taxes.
See Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998) (imposing a three-year moratorium on a variety of Internetrelated taxes); Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 107-75, 115 Stat. 703 (2001)
(extending the moratorium to November 1, 2003). The recent willingness of states to harmonize
their sales-tax systems—spurred by their serious needs for new revenues—may convince Congress
to remove the bar on such taxation. See Brian Krebs, Study Questions Net Tax Payoff, WASH.
POST.COM, Mar. 13, 2003 (explaining that potential lost tax revenues may give states sufficient
incentive to simplify their tax systems), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A21580-2003Mar13.html. Thus, if the States could coalesce around something like the UMSA, the
costs of state regulation might diminish considerably.
135. The problem will be even more complicated if the use of P2P providers to send
international transfers becomes a significant market. Currently, that market is dominated by
depositary institutions like CitiBank. See supra note 20 (discussing international P2P transfers).
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path for the time being might be to foster broad enactment of regulations
similar to the UMSA (broadened to cover EBPP providers), it is difficult to
believe that anybody trying to design a rational system would conclude that
parallel regulation by all local jurisdictions is the most appropriate way to
regulate the Internet-based entities under discussion.
A second possibility would be to allow regulation of the intermediary in
a particular state jurisdiction in which the intermediary could be said to be
located.136 Internet scholars have tried hard to resolve such choice-of-law
questions to make a territorial allocation of regulatory authority.137 To the
extent those efforts speak to this question, they generally suggest that each
jurisdiction in which the consumers reside would have the power to regulate
the entities in question.138 But scholars have not achieved a clear consensus
about a basis for a particular location taking the regulatory lead, largely
because there is a clear consensus that the location of the physical aspects of
the system (the Web server that contains the Web site, for example) should
not be dispositive.139
Moreover, even if a consensus could be reached, under which all of the
states (and affected foreign countries) would agree that a single state has the
sole power to regulate the entity, a substantial problem would remain in the
gross lack of symmetry between the reach of the regulated market (basically
national, with international aspects) and the constituency of the regulator
(statewide). Relying on basic public-choice concepts, the lack of symmetry
imposes a substantial risk that the jurisdiction in which the intermediary is
located will adopt rules unduly favorable to the intermediary. This risk is
particularly salient if the jurisdiction obtains substantial benefits from the
location of the intermediary in the jurisdiction (through employment or
taxes), while most of the intermediary’s customers are located in other
jurisdictions.140
PayPal, however, is beginning to play a significant part in that market as well and has experienced
some widely noted difficulties. See Drew Cullen, Brits! Play the PayPal Currency Speculation
Game, REGISTER, Feb. 27, 2003 (describing errors caused by an incorrect dollar-pound exchange
rate at the PayPal site), available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/29508.html; Drew
Cullen, PayPal Reimburses Brits, REGISTER, Mar. 1, 2003 (describing plans to reimburse customers
who overpaid for dollar-pound conversions), available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content
/6/29532.html.
136. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-307(e) (2003) (adopting a bright-line rule for purposes of personal
property lending that a corporation is located in the jurisdiction under whose laws it is organized).
137. E.g., American Bar Association Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project, Achieving Legal
and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet,
55 BUS. LAW. 1801 (2000) [hereinafter ABA Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project].
138. Id. at 1905–15 (discussing jurisdictional issues for payment systems and banking services
provided over the Internet).
139. See id. at 1908–11 (remarking that technology has diminished the significance of the
system’s physical components for jurisdictional purposes regarding activities in Cyberspace).
140. This argument is parallel to the race-to-the-bottom argument in corporate law. Whatever
the truth of the matter on that issue, the problem seems more serious here because of the lack of
symmetry discussed in the text.
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The basic problem is that the issues that motivate the regulation are not
sufficiently related to state-level variations and circumstances to make statelevel regulation optimal. Thus, perhaps the best approach would be a federal
statute. This proposition does not suggest that state law-enforcement
authorities are not so interested in the closely related problem of money
laundering that they will resist any lessening of their authority in the area.
But it is to say that these issues of consumer protection are more likely to be
addressed optimally at the federal level.
At the federal level, the simplest response would be to require these
services to be provided by banks, which would obviate the need for any
specific regulatory legislation. But as discussed above, the business that
these intermediaries operate suggests that bank-type regulation is unduly
onerous. Thus, a better approach would be regulatory legislation tailored for
these intermediaries. It might seem implausible in the current environment
to expect Congress to create a new federal regulatory regime,141 particularly
when the regime seems to fall in the area of commercial law that Congress
traditionally has left to state regulation. On the other hand, the recent
experience of the Check 21 Act (passed by both houses of Congress during
its current legislative session)142 suggests that the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve enjoys a sufficiently influential position with Congress to

141. The poor response to Federal Reserve efforts to consider the appropriate level of
regulation for stored-value cards is the most obvious example. The story starts with the Federal
Reserve’s proposal of some mild regulations. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 59 Fed. Reg. 10684
(proposed Mar. 7, 1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposing revisions to the Electronic
Fund Transfers Act of 1978). Hostile reaction led the Federal Reserve to change the regulatory
proposal into a report to Congress. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER ACT TO ELECTRONIC
STORED-VALUE PRODUCTS (Mar. 1997), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs
/rptcongress/efta_rpt.pdf. Adverse reaction to that report led the Federal Reserve to effectively table
it, and no action has been taken in the six years since the report was sent to Congress. See Taft,
supra note 57, at 45 (suggesting that the Fed did not pursue the proposal because “concerns about
hindering the development of new technology prevailed over additional protections for consumers
using stored-value products”). This outcome is of course an obvious change from previous decades,
when it was plausible to think that Congress would step in to protect consumers when neither the
UCC nor the Federal Reserve would take action. See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, Orders
and Incentives as Regulatory Methods: The Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987, 35 UCLA L.
REV. 1115, 1130–50 (1988). Indeed, the hostility to any new regulation poses a substantial obstacle
to the suggestions that I make in Part III, supra note 94 and accompanying text.
142. The House on June 5, 2003 passed the Check 21 Act, H.R. 1474, 108th Cong. (2003). The
Senate on June 26, 2003 passed its version, the Check Truncation Act, S. 1334, 108th Cong. (2003).
The statute generally is designed to facilitate the processing of checks by means of images instead
of the cumbersome paper originals. For the explanation from the Federal Reserve (which drafted
the statute), see Fed. Res. Bd., Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act, at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/paymentsystems/truncation/default.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). The same topic was
within the mandate of the Drafting Committee recently charged with promulgating revisions to
UCC Articles 3 and 4 (for which I was the Reporter). The Committee was unable to pursue that
topic because of its inability to produce a consensus regarding an appropriate reconciliation of the
interest in technological advance with the concerns of consumers about continuing to receive their
cancelled checks. The Federal Reserve, of course, is free to proceed at the federal level without
such a consensus.
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obtain enactment of legislation designed to ensure the effective operation of
the payment system. Given the interest that researchers at the Federal
Reserve’s constituent banks have taken in these developments,143 it is not farfetched to think that the Federal Reserve might take the lead in developing
such a statute.
3. Regulating Banks as Gatekeepers.—The final approach is the most
adventurous: directly obligating banks to ensure compliance with the
EFTA/E and TILA/Z regimes for all transactions at the bank. The premise
here is to view the bank as a gatekeeper that will both monitor the
intermediary to ensure that it behaves appropriately and exclude those that
cannot be induced to behave appropriately.144
Because the problems discussed in Part III arise only if the
intermediaries can access accounts at the bank, the bank is theoretically in a
position to control the activities of the intermediaries. For example, the
simplest response to such a scheme might be for the bank to provide by
contract that the intermediary would be responsible to the bank for the costs
that the bank incurs for Regulation E compliance related to transactions that
the intermediary conducted on the accounts of the bank’s customers. The
bank would take the cost-effective steps to minimize the costs that it incurs
from any failure of the intermediary to satisfy those obligations: it might
require the intermediary to obtain a letter of credit from another institution,
post a bond, or simply deposit a reserve of funds in the bank against which
the bank could draw for those expenses.
This approach has several benefits. One obvious benefit is that it
protects consumers from asset insufficiency on the part of the
intermediaries.145 The gatekeeper strategy is uniquely suited to situations in
which practicable legal remedies are not adequate to ensure full compliance
with regulatory responsibilities.146 Another potential benefit relates to the
likelihood that the banks on which the risk of loss ultimately would fall are
larger, better capitalized, and more diversified in the range of their operations
than the intermediaries for whom the banks are to be the gatekeepers.
Specifically, if the greater size and financial sophistication of the banks

143. For examples of work on these developments by Federal Reserve researchers, see Kuttner
& McAndrews, supra note 11; Mester, supra note 11; McHugh, supra note 81.
144. For the most general formulation of this regulatory structure, see Reinier H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986)
[hereinafter Kraakman, Gatekeeper Anatomy]. Within Kraakman’s framework, this regulatory
structure would be an instance of the use of gatekeeper liability to remedy enforcement
insufficiency. For a general discussion, see Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies
and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 888–96 (1984) [hereinafter Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies].
145. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 144, at 869–71 (discussing the
potential benefit of gatekeeper strategies).
146. See Kraakman, Gatekeeper Anatomy, supra note 144, at 56.
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makes it more cost-effective for them to bear and spread those losses, then
the gatekeeper regime would lower the total cost of those losses.147
A more general benefit is that the bank should be more effective at
monitoring the activities of the provider than government regulators, because
the bank arguably148 would have a strong incentive—maximizing the value
of the account services received by its customers—to ensure that the regulations that it imposes on the intermediaries do not unduly burden the activities
of the intermediaries. If the bank attempts to exclude those intermediaries by
imposing excessive burdens on them—burdens that are not cost-justified—
the bank would reduce the net value of the services that the bank could
extract from its customers. If so, we might expect customers to migrate to
banks that reach more effective arrangements with the intermediaries.
The banks should be in a better position than any government regulator
to assess in a dynamic and informed way the relative benefits and burdens of
various responses that the bank might take in response to a gatekeeping
responsibility.149 For example, the banks are likely to assess the legitimacy
of the activities of the intermediary more knowledgeably than any
regulator.150 In addition, it seems unlikely that the banks would cooperate
with the intermediaries in misconduct—a particularly topical concern in
gatekeeping arrangements in a post-Enron environment.151
In sum, the bank would be in a position to make intelligent, marketdriven choices about how to trade off expenditures on monitoring the
activities of the intermediary versus simple reliance on monetary assurances
from the intermediary or bonds from fiscally responsible third parties. This
choice is particularly important given the complicated, technology-sensitive,
and rapidly developing nature of the industry.

147. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 144, at 864–67.
148. This discussion assumes that the bank is not motivated by an anti-competitive desire to
stifle the intermediary’s service. I discuss that problem infra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
149. In Kraakman’s terms, this regime is a “chaperone” regime, in which “gatekeepers can
detect and disrupt misconduct in an unfolding relationship” with enforcement targets. Kraakman,
Gatekeeper Anatomy, supra note 144, at 63.
150. See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 925–27
(1998) (emphasizing the importance of “screening accuracy” to a successful gatekeeper strategy);
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 144, at 891 (emphasizing the importance to
successful gatekeeper strategies of “low-cost access to information about firm delicts”). Assaf
Hamdani explores the risks and advantages of various gatekeeper strategies and the appropriate
scope of gatekeeper liability in great detail in an as yet unpublished working paper. Assaf Hamdani,
Assessing Gatekeeper Liability (Jan. 2003) (preliminary and incomplete working draft, on file with
author).
151. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57
BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002); Kraakman, Gatekeeper Anatomy, supra note 144, at 69–72 (emphasizing
the importance of avoiding “corruption” of gatekeepers); Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies,
supra note 144, at 891 (emphasizing the importance of using “incorruptible outsiders” as
gatekeepers).
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The gatekeeper approach presents several obvious problems. First, it
would be likely to increase the costs of the bank’s activities, and thus the
costs of the services provided to the bank’s customers. In an era when the
number of consumers who are priced out of the market for banking services
already is sufficiently high to be a cause for policy concern,152 any initiative
that might aggravate that problem warrants serious scrutiny. But the twin
premises of this approach would be (1) that those costs would not be
substantial unless there was a significant risk that the intermediaries would
fail to comply if left to their own devices (thus letting those costs fall on
consumers in any event); and (2) that the banks are much better situated than
government agents to identify and minimize those costs.
Another problem with this approach is that it does not address privacy
issues at all. Because a simple monetary remedy—restoring funds
improperly removed from the consumer’s deposit account—does not as
easily remedy privacy issues, this type of remedy offers no protection on that
score.
Another obvious problem is technological: the effectiveness of the
approach depends entirely on the ability of banks in fact to control the
conduct of the intermediaries.153 As the controversy over screen-scraping
suggests, it is not clear that current technology permits banks to prevent
intermediaries from accessing their customers’ accounts without their
consent, because it is difficult for the bank to distinguish between two different persons accessing the Web site. If both the intermediary and the
customer have the customer’s user ID and password, the bank’s server
probably will not be able to ascertain which of the two is accessing the
account on any particular occasion.154 If this problem is true, then
technology alone will not permit the bank to use the threat of exclusion to
control the intermediary’s access.

152. See, e.g., Molly Hooper, No-Cost Checking for Poor and Elderly Killed in California
Senate Committee, AM. BANKER, May 29, 1985, at 3; Consumers Union, Consumers Union Policy
Statement on Electronic Money and Banking (Apr. 1997) (“The potential impact of new payment
and banking technology on the availability and affordability of traditional banking and payment
services is immediately troubling.”), at http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/elect$.htm.
153. See Hamdani, supra note 150, at 40 (observing that, all else being equal, when gatekeepers
are more effective at preventing wrongdoing, strict liability for gatekeepers is more desirable);
Kraakman, Gatekeeper Anatomy, supra note 144; Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra
note 144, at 890 (“The first requisite for gatekeeper liability is, of course, an outsider who can
influence [the subject] to forgo offenses.”).
154. The controversy over the use of screen-scraping by financial institutions to collect
comprehensive profiles of their customers’ financial affairs strongly suggests this problem, because
that controversy rests on the premise that the “screen-scraper” can scrape information from another
bank’s Web site without the knowledge of the bank operating the site. E.g., Andreeff et al., supra
note 9, at 9; Andrew Roth, CheckFree Says It Will Use Screen Scraping, AM. BANKER, Mar. 22,
2001, at 10 (describing screen scraping as “a practice by which information is simply lifted from a
Web site, generally without the site owner’s permission or knowledge”).
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That technological problem seems unlikely to be a serious problem of
regulatory design. It would be easy enough to impose a general prohibition
(akin to the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (the CFAA))
on accessing a customer’s account without the consent of the bank.155 With a
broadening of the CFAA, intermediaries would not be able to access deposit
accounts without permission from the bank. The bank, in turn, could
condition its permission on the formation of a contract relationship with the
intermediary that would include whatever terms were appropriate to
implement the bank’s responsibility for regulatory compliance.
Finally, the most serious difficulty with that approach is the possibility
that it will have a markedly adverse competitive effect. As the discussion
above emphasizes, both the P2P and EBPP markets currently include a
number of nonbank entities competing directly against banks.156 Although a
regime in which banks control access to the accounts for which payment
intermediaries provide services may not be as exclusive as a regime in which
those services can be provided only by banks, the potential for anticompetitive conduct is obvious. If applicable regulations permit banks to
impose onerous terms on the intermediaries, then the bank’s ability to drive
those providers from the marketplace might be enhanced.157
On the other hand, this kind of conduct would be effective only if banks
as a group colluded to exclude the intermediaries. As discussed above, a
bank that tried to impose undue burdens on intermediaries to exclude them
from the bank’s customers would face competition from other banks that
might try to maximize the value of services they could provide to their own
customers by entering into value-increasing arrangements with
intermediaries.158 Because the banking industry is highly competitive, it is
doubtful that collusive exclusionary tactics would be effective. Moreover,
particularly in light of the competitive structure of the banking industry, it
may be reasonable to rely on traditional antitrust enforcement to protect
providers from such practices.

155. Screen scraping and EBPP services generally do not violate this statute because the screen
scrapers and EBPP providers have authorization from the customer. But see infra note 166
(discussing settled litigation in which First Union Bank claimed that PayTrust’s procedures violated
the Computer Fraud Abuse Act).
156. E.g., Chandler, supra note 37, at 2 (noting the competition between banks and newer
entrants over the new “delivery channels”); Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the Titans: Regulating
the Competition Between Established and Emerging Electronic Payment Systems, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 675 (1999) (noting the rise of new payments entities to compete with the existing
businesses).
157. The hostility of banks to intermediary access to their accounts is not purely hypothetical.
For example, see the litigation between First Union and PayTrust mentioned infra note 166.
158. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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C. Recommendations
For several reasons, it is not plausible at this stage to offer a definitive
“answer” to the problem of regulatory strategy that this Article addresses.
For one thing, the industries are developing and changing so rapidly that the
object of inquiry is a moving target. For another, information about how the
systems in fact operate is scarce, and it is difficult to assess the weight of the
competing concerns. We know next to nothing about the rates of fraud and
error in these systems, the culture of data privacy in the industry, and the
degree of compliance with regulatory responsibilities. Finally, because the
possible risks of allowing unregulated access to consumer deposit accounts
and of hasty intervention in a fluid competitive situation are not readily
balanced against each other, an element of frank judgment is necessary to
resolve a conflict between them.
Still, the analysis of the alternatives presented above does support some
tentative recommendations about the most promising avenues of relief. The
recommendations that follow take the perspective that the correct answer to
the problem provides consumers protections as close to what they have for
conventional financial relationships as seems practicable, without unduly
harming the potential for competition and innovation in the industry. Those
recommendations reflect in part an attempt to foster outcomes likely to be
consistent with consumer expectations. The recommendations also reflect an
implicit willingness to place considerable weight on concerns about privacy
issues. It seems much more troubling from a privacy perspective to have
consumer financial information in the hands of wholly unregulated and thinly
capitalized companies than in the hands of banks. In any event, because the
recommendations rest heavily on those perspectives, it is worth emphasizing
that policymakers who do not place as much importance on these concerns
would reach different conclusions.
1. P2P Intermediaries.—Selecting a regulatory approach for the P2P
intermediaries is difficult for a variety of reasons. First, because of the
persistent allegations of misconduct by PayPal—none of which, to be sure,
seems to have resulted in any proof of serious misconduct—it seems
unacceptable to have PayPal completely unregulated.159 At the same time,

159. I have no basis for forming an opinion about the merits of those allegations. I simply note
that they are quite numerous. For eBay’s formal disclosure about litigation related to those
problems, see EBAY INC., FORM 10-Q, at 15 (Nov. 14, 2002) (reporting for the quarterly period
which ended on September 30, 2002), available at http://www.shareholder.com/Common/Edgar
/1065088/891618-02-5206/02-00.pdf. For news stories about those problems, see, for example,
Craig Bicknell, Anti-Fraud That’s Anti-Consumer, WIRED NEWS, July 24, 2000 (noting the
frustration of a customer whose credit card was deemed suspicious by PayPal’s anti-fraud program),
at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367 ,37642,00.html; Dan Knight, PayPal Insecurity,
MACMUSINGS, Aug. 8, 2002 (expressing the concern that “all it takes is hacking a password to rob
someone blind”), at http://lowendmac.com/musings/02/0808.html; Keith Regan, PayPal Users Sue
Over Frozen Funds, E-COM. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002 (discussing a lawsuit alleging failure to comply
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the competitive landscape shows a tension between PayPal—now owned by
eBay—and smaller competitors primarily controlled by banks. In that
setting, it seems particularly inappropriate to use the gatekeeper strategy to
subject PayPal’s operations to the control of the banking industry. For the
same reason, it seems absurd to say that P2P services must be provided by a
bank. That requirement simply forces eBay to sell PayPal to a bank. The
evident synergy between PayPal’s operations and eBay’s suggests that any
such outcome would unnecessarily destroy some significant opportunity for
innovation in the provision of payment services.160
My views on that point are strongly influenced by the potential of
PayPal to be a major competitive figure as Internet payment systems develop
in the years to come. For example, it is a well-known aspect of the Internet
that the payment systems available for Internet retailers are wholly
inadequate: they are both expensive and subject to high rates of fraud161 (the
costs of which are born directly by the retailers). Yet, the major credit card
networks have retained a dominant near-monopoly position in that market.162
PayPal is already one of their strongest competitors, as it provides payment
services to smaller merchants that find it uneconomical to join Visa or
MasterCard directly.163 An unconstrained PayPal may have the potential to
be a risk for consumers. But, at the same time, an unconstrained PayPal that
forces Visa, MasterCard, and the banking industry to look constantly over
their shoulders could do more for the competitiveness of Internet payment
providers than any pressure that the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice has brought to bear.164
More broadly, the introduction of this Article notes the persistent failure
of electronic-money products to take hold on the Internet. If there is a
market for a new and innovative electronic-money product, the likelihood
that such a product will be developed, implemented, and deployed successfully is maximized by a regulatory system that permits the continuing

with Regulation E), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/16751.html.
Two sites
collecting criticisms of PayPal are www.paypalwarning.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2003), and
www.paypalsucks.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
160. See, e.g., Peter Lucas, eBay Puts Its Mark on PayPal, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Apr. 2003, at
34 (discussing eBay’s strategic use of its control of PayPal).
161. See ePaynews.com, US Credit Card Fraud Statistics, supra note 1. The basic Visa
electronic commerce interchange rate, for example, is 1.80% plus $0.10. That is considerably
higher than the base (CPS Retail) rate of 1.37% plus $0.10. See Cardweb.com, Inc., Visa
Interchange, at http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/MerchantFees/2002/visa.html (last visited
Nov. 17, 2003) (copy on file with author).
162. See supra note 1.
163. See Mantel & McHugh, supra note 5, at 5–6 (noting the potential for P2P providers to
provide competition in the provision of payment services to small businesses).
164. The government has, however, recently obtained a trial-court judgment against Visa and
MasterCard in an antitrust action challenging several aspects of the industry’s structure. United
States v. Visa, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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presence of a large player like PayPal not wedded to the existing payments
networks.
The foregoing comments seem to leave a choice between doing nothing
and adopting the light federal regulatory regime previously discussed.165
Doing nothing of course does not leave PayPal completely unregulated,
because it already is under the supervision of money-transmitter statutes in a
number of states. And the events to date make it difficult to be sure that the
risk of duplicative or inappropriate regulation—either excessive or too
lenient—will cause problems. In any event, in a perfect world, a single
federal arrangement would make more sense. Given the fact that PayPal’s
parent eBay already must comply with the increasingly onerous requirements
that come with its listing on NASDAQ, it seems unlikely that those requirements would impose costs that would have competitive significance to
PayPal. And at the same time they should go far to assuage the concerns
summarized above about PayPal’s responsibility for its regulatory
obligations.
2. EBPP Intermediaries.—It is much harder to come to rest on a
recommendation for the EBPP systems. Because their operations necessarily
involve pervasive access to consumer deposit accounts, privacy and fraud
concerns are more substantial than in the P2P context. P2P providers by
contrast, are likely for many consumers to conduct their operations without
any mechanism for accessing the consumer’s deposit account. To be sure,
reports of problems with the EBPP systems to date are few,166 but the fluidity
of the highly fractionated market gives little basis for confidence that all
members of the industry will be responsible. Thus, it seems unacceptable to
think that the current regulatory framework will be suitable in the end.
At the same time, it seems excessive to say that only banks can provide
those services. Among other things, a rule limiting those services to banks
would significantly diminish the likelihood of a universal payment service.
In the end, one can make a strong case that such a site is at least part of the
165. See supra section IV(B)(2).
166. PayTrust has generally gotten good marks on such questions. See, e.g., Don Willmott, Bill
Payment, ZDNET, Nov. 28, 2000 (lauding insurance for negligent and fraudulent transactions), at
http://www.zdnet.com/products/stories/reviews/0,4161,2658209,00.html; PayTrust: On Being
Trustworthy to Pay the Bills, EXAMINER (discussing PayTrust’s security efforts), at http://www.the
examiner.biz/Security/paytrust.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). On the other hand, one Federal
Reserve analyst has noted a conspicuous lack of common error-resolution services by EBPP
providers. Mantel, supra note 2, at 26–27.
More specifically, even PayTrust has had some legal problems. For example, First Union Bank
sued PayTrust, arguing that PayTrust’s activities involved the unauthorized extraction of data from
the bank’s Web site, in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030. The
lawsuit reportedly settled after changes in some of PayTrust’s practices. See ALAN CHARLES RAUL,
PROTECTING FACTUAL DATA (June 2000), at http://www.sidley.com/cyberlaw/features/protecting
_fd.asp. It is not clear, of course, whether that litigation reflects a failure of PayTrust to respect
consumer privacy or an anticompetitive desire by First Union to exclude PayTrust from its
accounts.
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optimal response, because it would be easier for it to overcome the classic
bandwagon-effects problems of attracting sufficient billers and consumer
payers as customers.167 Of course, such a site still could develop in a “bankonly” approach, through contracts by individual banks with a dominant
provider like CheckFree. A serious cost of the bank-only approach is the
possibility it will lessen the potential for such a service.
That leaves for consideration the intermediate approaches of industryspecific regulation and the use of banks as gatekeepers. The gatekeeper
approach has several positive qualities. It would permit a tempered168 market
experiment of competition between the more sophisticated universal model,
on the one hand, and the simpler Internet banking and biller models, on the
other hand. Thus, it would help reveal the strength of consumer preferences
for the different models.169 At the same time, it would provide the strongest
assurance that consumers in fact would be protected from losses from fraud
and error.
But the gatekeeper approach would do nothing to ensure the privacy of
consumer information: it is feasible to require banks to hold deposit accounts
unharmed from unauthorized transactions, but it is much more problematic to
require them to ensure that intermediaries comply with their privacy
obligations. A light scheme of federal regulation like the one discussed
above170 could include monitoring of data-privacy compliance to assuage that
concern. Moreover, the gatekeeper approach creates a substantial risk of
anti-competitive conduct by banks tempted to exclude their nonbank
competitors.171 A separate federal regulatory apparatus would avoid that
problem.
V.

Conclusion

This Article is not an effort to write the last word on Internet payment
intermediaries. Rather, it is an opening effort to explore the policy issues
raised by the ongoing developments in the industry. It sets the way for two
steps of response. First, Part III suggests some minor updating to make the
existing rules apply more coherently to the new transactions. The types of
transactions that this Article discusses have reached a volume and level of

167. See, e.g., CheckFree, Understanding EBP Models, supra note 30, at 3–4 (discussing
industry research suggesting the long-term superiority of that option); MURPHY REPORT, supra note
35, at 40, 42 (highlighting faster consumer adoption as a benefit of “aggregator/consolidator”
models of EBPP).
168. The experiment is tempered because of the dampening on competition inherent in the
gatekeeper approach.
169. One industry analyst argues cogently that the typical consumer eventually will come to use
an aggregate site for most bills, and direct sites for a few important bills (such as a credit card) for
which the consumer is more concerned about reviewing bill details. See MURPHY REPORT, supra
note 35, at 43.
170. See supra section IV(B)(2).
171. See supra section IV(B)(3).
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stability that warrants adjustment of the regulatory regime. The basic
premise of those adjustments is that consumers should not lose the
protections they would have under conventional systems solely because they
access those systems through a new Internet interface or intermediary. The
need to allow experimentation among competing technologies does not
require absolving those that conduct novel new payment transactions from
the responsibilities that are customary for the conventional transactions
conducted using the systems on which they rely.
Second, as discussed in Part IV, there are serious questions about the
adequacy of the background framework that protects against abuses of the
system either by those in the industry or by third parties attempting to take
advantage of them. It certainly is important to give developing sectors of
commerce an opportunity to stabilize before intervening with regulation that
might freeze the industry’s structure too soon. But there also is a substantial
risk in waiting too long. Here, it is not at all clear that we know enough to
make sensible decisions about the appropriate policy responses. The
suggestions in Part IV are intended to be just that—illustrations of one way
of resolving the various policy concerns based on one set of assumptions
about the relevant facts and weight of the affected interests.
If anything, it is clear that a more informed decision could be made after
a thorough study by a responsible entity of the federal government (such as
the Federal Reserve), using its power to collect information from the
industry. Such a study could provide an empirical sense of the significance
of the problems that this Article discusses and develop a balanced solution
that is sensitive to all the relevant interests.

